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Homosexual Organizations and the
Right of Association
By LAWRENCE A. WILSON*
RAPHAEL SHANNON**
The love that dare not speak its name has lately taken to roaring it.
By mid-1978, the issue of homosexuality and the rights of homosexuals
has become a topic of conversation, the frequent subject of newspaper
and periodical articles, legislative debates, initiative and referenda con-
tests, and litigation.
Once content to be simply left alone, to gather in private social
settings free from official harassment, courageous homosexuals began
forming rights groups after what came to be called the Stonewall Riots
of 1961.1 Responding to perceived police harassment of gay2-oriented
bars in New York City's Greenwich Village, homosexuals reacted to a
police raid with a night of shouting, missile throwing, and demonstra-
tions, giving birth to what many feel is the modem gay rights
movement.
3
It is a movement confronting many obstacles. On the religious
front, most Christian denominations, citing Biblical passages, 4 con-
demn homosexuals as sinful and refuse to ordain openly homosexual
* B.A., 1972, University of the South, J.D., 1977, Hastings College of the Law. Mem-
ber of the California Bar.
** B.A., 1972, Antioch College; J.D., 1978, Hastings College of the Law. Member of
the California Bar.
1. See 4 Policemen Hurt in 'Village'Raid, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1969, § 1, at 33, col. 1;
Police Again Rout 'Village' Youths, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1969, § 1, at 22, col. 1.
2. This term of uncertain origin will be used in the text interchangeably with the term
homosexual, whose meaning is discussed at text accompanying notes 11-13 infra. "Gay" has
not achieved common usage in formal English, although both Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary and the Random House Dictionary of the English Language give "homosex-
ual" as a synonym for "gay," albeit in the latter as slang. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 941 (1976); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 587 (1966). The authors use both terms to refer to lesbians as well as homosex-
ual males.
3. See O'Leary & Voeller, Confusion En Route to Equality, JuRIs DoCToR, June/July
1978, at 36.
4. Eg., Leviticus 18:22; Romans 1:25-27.
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applicants.5 Although nineteen states have repealed statutes control-
ling consensual, adult sexual activity,6 the physical acts by which
homosexuals consumate their relationships remain forbidden in most
jurisdictions and make each "practicing" homosexual a criminal. At-
tempts to have homosexuals included among the class of groups pro-
tected under fair employment and housing laws have been largely
unsuccessful. Where jurisdictions, primarily city or county govern-
ments, have passed ordinances protecting homosexuals from discrimi-
nation, repeal efforts cast in the form of referenda or initiatives have
been successful, with one exception, whenever placed on the ballot.
7
Thus rebuffed by the legislative process, homosexuals and their sup-
porters have sought judicial protection for themselves as individuals
and as organizations formed to promote their interests.
This Article will focus on the response by governmental agencies
and the courts to efforts by homosexuals to form organizations to fur-
ther their interests and the application of the right of association doc-
trine to regulations and acts that prevent individuals from obtaining
the benefits of association.
Two considerations should be noted in examining the associa-
tional rights of organizations. First, as an extension of individual free-
dom, associations of individuals give greater scope to each individual's
ideas and desires; therefore associations of individuals should be enti-
tled to do whatever one individual may do. Of course, conduct which
may be prohibited to an individual may be prohibited to an association
of individuals. Second, the focusing of effort and resources through
association often results in an organization's being able to achieve re-
5. See Presbyterians Reject the Ordination of Homosexuals, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1978,
§ 1, at 17, col. 1. For an examination of the influence of the Christian Church on the devel-
opment of both religious and secular sanctions against homosexuality see Barrett, Legal
Homophobia and the Christian Church, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1019 (1979).
6. O'Leary & Voeller, Confusion En Route to Equality, JURIs DOCTOR, June/July
1978, at 36. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position ofHomosexual Per-
sons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 949, Appendix A (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Rivera].
7. See Rivera supra note 6, at 810 n.61. An attempt to repeal an ordinance including
gays among the categories of persons protected against employment and housing discrimina-
tion in Seattle failed. California's Proposition 6 of 1978, the so-called Briggs Initiative,
which sought to amend the state education code by adding sections which would have per-
mitted the firing and the refusal to hire homosexual teachers or others who supported the
right of individuals of the same sex to have sexual relations even in private, was defeated in
the November general election. See Victory in California, Seattle; Miami Defeat, The Advo-
cate, December 13, 1978, at 9, col. 1.
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suits so far beyond individual effort as to be qualitatively different.8
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the unique importance
of the right of individuals to associate for the purpose of achieving re-
suits capable of being reached only through group effort.9
Analysis will be limited to the civil disabilities of homosexual or-
ganizations and the nature of constitutional protection of organiza-
tions; it will not deal with first amendment issues raised by the personal
rights of homosexual individuals unconnected to any organization.10
A. Distinctions with a Difference
Preliminarily, a word must be said about the definition of homo-
sexuality, for from it we perceive a division of homosexuals into two
groups. Websters Third New International Dictionary" gives as the first
two definitions of homosexuality:
1.: atypical sexuality characterized by manifestation of sexual de-
sire toward a member of one's own sex
2.: erotic activity with a member of one's own sex--compare
lesbianism
The first definition is essentially neutral in the eyes of the law. The
word "atypical" simply means not typical; irregular or out of the norm;
essentially, in, or of, a minority. Manifesting sexual desire is different
than acting upon it, and this passive aspect distinguishes the first defini-
tion from the second, which speaks of erotic physical activity. The first
definition might be termed "passive", the second "functional." One
who finds his or her primary social, emotional, and intellectual needs
satisfied by members of the same sex might feel that he or she is a
homosexual without ever having had (or before ever having had) sex-
ual activity, thus being a homosexual under the "passive" definition but
not the "functional" one. This group might include those above or be-
low the age continuum of sexually active persons as well as those celi-
bate for either religious or personal reasons. Those in the second
8. Emerson, Freedom ofAssociation and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 4
(1964).
9. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958). See also Commu-
nist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 449 (1974); William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 30 (1968).
10. Some contexts in which personal rights of association are raised are: probation
conditions restricting association with "known homosexuals," see United States v. Kohlberg,
472 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1973), and the revocation of liquor licenses due to the congregation
of homosexuals in the bar, see Rivera, supra note 6, at 1205-15; Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 1254
(1969). See generally Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48
N.Y.U.L. REv. 670, 726-27 (1973) for a list of the civil disabilities of homosexuals.
11. WEaSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 941 (1976).
March 1979] HOMOSEXUAL ORGANIZATIONS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
group, sexually active homosexuals, are subject to prosecution for their
acts in all but nineteen states. This first definition allows courts and
governmental agencies to avoid considering all homosexuals and ho-
mosexual organizations aspeople who commit, with members of the same
sex, sexual actsforbidden by law. Although not stated as a rationale for
any decision, this distinction has, in some instances, permitted courts to
avoid difficult questions in making their decisions; 12 in other instances,
failure to acknowledge this passive/functional distinction has resulted
in decisions which infringe upon the rights of homosexual groups. 13
The view the law takes of homosexuals and homosexual organiza-
tions must necessarily track this dichotomy. Anglo-Saxon jurispru-
dence demands an act (or the omission of an act when there is a legal
duty to act) as a prerequisite to the imposition of criminal sanctions.14
Thus statutes can condemn only the external or functional manifesta-
tions of homosexuality, not the same-sex attraction of the "passive" ho-
mosexual. The constitutional bar to the imposition of a penalty for a
person's condition or status disallows the punishment of those who are
homosexuals in the first sense and yet never commit homosexual sex
acts. 15
While the constitution extends its protection to the status of homo-
sexuality, 16 no constitutional provision bars the states from prohibiting
homosexual acts. The latter point was most recently asserted in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond,17 in which the United States
12. In re Eimers 258 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978). See cases cited in Rivera, supra note 6, at 904
nn.10-15.
13. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 982 (1977); State v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 313 N.E.2d 847 (1974).
14. See generally Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 166 (4th Cir.
1976); J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 171-211 (2d ed. 1960).
15. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962): "[W]e deal with a statute
which makes the 'status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense. . . . We hold that a state
law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched
any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." See also
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1971). The authors do not mean to indi-
cate that they believe homosexuality to be a sickness or affliction such as those mentioned in
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666, nor that compulsory treatment is appropriate. In fact medical
and social scientists disagree on the origins or "causes" of homosexuality. TRIPP, THE Ho-
MOSEXUAL MATRIX (1977). It is our opinion, however, that individuals defining themselves
as homosexuals under either definition would feel they are homosexuals at all times, not just
homosexuals during the moments when they are interacting on whatever level with members
of the same sex.
16. Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848, 856 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1276 (1978).
17. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See Richards, SexualAutonomy and the Constitutional Right to
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Supreme Court summarily affirmed a three-judge federal court deci-
sion which held that Virginia's criminal sodomy statute did not violate
the constitutional rights of consenting adults even though it prohibited
the private performance of sex acts.
The passive/functional dichotomy has been left unclarified by de-
cisions such as Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorneyfor Richmond, with the
result that bureaucrats and the courts have become confused in distin-
guishing between the illegality of homosexual acts and the legal pur-
poses for which organizations may be formed.18 This confusion
continues even in states in which sodomy laws have been repealed; the
long history of oppression of homosexuals often returns in the guise of
a "public policy," given as the reason for denying benefits to homosex-
ual organizations.' 9 This denial is often simply the manifestation of a
fear that recognition or a grant of benefits indicates an approval or con-
donation of homosexual orientation; likewise the legal import or actual
meaning of the word "gay" in an organizational title is often the cause
of consternation among administrative officials. 20
The Right of Association and Homosexual Rights-An
Overview
The first amendment right of association has undergone substan-
tial development since it was first articulated as an independent right
Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Richards].
18. See, e.g., Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial
Foundation, 417 F. Supp. 632, 637 n.6 (D.R.I. 1976) ("In the present case, the Commission
admitted that one reason for its rejection of the plaintiffs' proposal was that certain practices
advocated by the "Gay Movement" are of questionable legality."); Gay Activists Alliance v.
Lomenzo, 66 Misc. 2d 456, 458, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1971), rev'dsub nom. Owles
v. Lomenzo, 38 App. Div. 2d 981, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1972), af'd sub nom. Gay Activists
Alliance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1973) ("If a lawful
purpose is sprinkled with unlawful activity a refusal to provide such activity with corporate
status cannot be an abuse of discretion.").
19. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 113, 313 N.E.2d 847, 848 (1974) ("Al-
though homosexual acts between consenting adults are no longer statutory offenses . . .
[p]romotion of homosexuality as a valid life style is still contrary to the public policy of the
state.").
20. See, e.g., McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he pro-
spective employee demands. . . the right to pursue an activist role in implementing his un-
conventional ideas concerning the societal status to be accorded homosexuals and, thereby,
to foist tacit approval of this socially repugnant concept upon his employer .. "); Toward
a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation, 417 F. Supp. 642,
645 (D.R.I. 1976) ("The general sentiment of the Commission and the principal reason for
denial of this proposal appeared to be that endorsement would involve approval.").
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implicit in first amendment guarantees. 2' The right of association may
be stated as follows: From the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and assembly is derived an independent right of association,
incorporated as part of the liberty assured by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, which protects, from interfering state ac-
tion, the ability of groups to express ideas and air grievances.
22
In applying this principle, courts have held that denying an associ-
ation benefits, however insignificant, which result in the lessening of
that organization's ability to effectuate legal purposes, when achieved
by "state action" and based on the content of protected speech, is a
violation of the freedom of association guaranteed by the first and four-
teenth amendments. 23 This rule implies acceptance of the social axiom
that the degree of effectiveness of organizations in carrying out their
purposes depends on their ability to communicate with potential mem-
bers and supporters, finance themselves, and make their presence felt
among the general population. Interference with this ability, even
where indirect, has been found by the Supreme Court to be offensive to
constitutional principles.
24
There are few right of association cases dealing with homosexual
organizations. The most positive reason for this is that in some parts of
the country the right of homosexuals to organize to further their inter-
ests is recognized and accepted. This social and political acceptance
generally occurs where laws regulating consensual, adult sexual activity
have been repealed. In much of the United States, however, homosex-
uals, for fear of personal harassment and loss of employment security,
shrink from either joining gay rights groups or drawing attention to
themselves by vigorously asserting their rights in the courts. Many
groups lack the financial resources required to pursue legal remedies
for violations of their rights and there is no well-funded, national gay
rights legal defense group capable of effectively assisting local groups.
Further, homosexual organizations have good reason to fear
"homophobia" 25 on the part of the judiciary.
26
21. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-62 (1958).
22. Id. at 459-61; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960).
23. See text accompanying notes 32-99 infra.
24. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960).
25. The fear of homosexuality or "the dread of being in close quarters with homosexu-
als-and in the case of homosexuals themselves, of self-loathing." G. WEINBERG, SOCIETY
AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL 4-5 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Doe v. Department of Transp., 412 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1969); Doe v.




The cases discussed in this Article arose out of problems which can
be characterized as "associational" in nature, in that the groups' ability
to carry out the purposes for which they were formed is impeded. This
may be because the groups' ability to get in touch with prospective
members, increase their memberships, hold meetings, incorporate in an
advantageous form, or raise funds has been impaired. These are all
goals peculiar to associations or groups. Thus a pragmatic analysis of
the effect of state interference results in characterizing the problem as
one amenable to a right of association analysis in that the activities
disrupted are concerted ones peculiar to groups rather than individu-
als.27 Generally, at issue is the ability to organize in a form which will
permit attainment of the results for which an organization is formed in
the first place-increased power of advocacy and the ability to commu-
nicate ideas and effect the organizational purpose.
Following an examination of the freedom of association doctrine,
this Article will discuss the application of that doctrine to constitutional
questions presented in cases in four general areas: recognition of cam-
pus groups, 28 advertisement of groups in telephone books and campus
newspapers,2 9 problems of incorporation,30 and tax-exempt status.
31
All four areas are joined by at least two common factors. In each area
the group was denied access to a benefit or forum which was created
for the purpose of assisting organizations to effect their goals. These
benefits or forums were created or regulated by an agency of the gov-
ernment at the federal, state, or local level; hence "state action" that
interferes with the associational rights of groups is at least arguably
present in each area.
The First Amendment Right of Association-Origin and
Development
The United States Constitution has as one of its purposes the pro-
tection of groups and individuals unable to command a political major-
ity and thus in need of guarantees by the state. The Constitution was
the product of a society which recognized that the success of its own
struggle for independence had been the result of the vigorous propa-
ganda campaign waged by a minority to convince the King's subjects
27. See Emerson, Freedom of Association andFreedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 3-
4 (1964).
28. See text accompanying notes 110-47 infra.
29. See text accompanying notes 166-210 infra.
30. See notes 211-39 & accompanying text infra.
31. See text accompanying notes 240-72 infra.
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of the rightness of their cause. The freedoms set forth in the first
amendment-freedom of speech, press, assembly, and the right to peti-
tion government for redress of grievances-can be seen as the fountain
from which the economic, social, and political successes of the nation
flow. The preservation of those freedoms, for the meanest and least
popular ideas, has been the history of first amendment cases.
That the wide latitude granted to individual expression by the first
amendment be extended on the same basis to groups of individuals is
only logical. In a society growing more complex daily the grouping
together of individuals to assert ideas gives their right to express them
meaning. For the obvious reason that it is the unpopular group expres-
sing a minority viewpoint that attracts the interference or regulation of
the government, the development of the first amendment right of asso-
ciation is largely a history of the protection of the rights of minorities.
32
The Court's difficult task has been to interpret the meaning of the
first amendment's words "law," "abridging," and "speech." It has had
to examine the activities to be regulated or impinged upon to determine
if they are speech or action. The distinction is often not clear. The
interest of the state sought to be protected by the complained-of action
must be examined in the light of the magnitude of its interference with
the right claimed to be abridged.
In the early part of this century, the Court gave great weight to the
governmental interest resulting in what came to be called the
bad-tendency test, paraphrased by one commentator thus: "expression
which had a tendency, or which the legislature could reasonably be-
lieve had a tendency, to lead to substantial evil could be prohibited."
33
The test was expressed vigorously by Justice Stanford upholding New
York's criminal anarchy laws in Gitlow v. New York:34 "That a State in
the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this free-
dom [of speech] by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to
corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not
open to question. '35 He wrote that the state is entitled to "extinguish
the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed
32. See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (black people):
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (politically dissident students); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Klu Klux Klan); Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) (black
people).
33. Emerson, Toward a General Theory ofthe First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 909
(1963).
34. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).




Even the strong dissent by Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Bran-
deis, in Gitlow, 37 (the "clear and present danger" test of Schenk v.
United States38) came to be supplanted by an ad hoc balancing test, in
which various factors are given weight according to their merit in each
case before the court. When the interest sought to be protected is
speech or expression, the great social utility and individual interest in
free speech must be balanced against the social value of the regulation
retarding free expression.
39
The balancing test, first expressed in Communications Association v.
Douds,40 was the lens through which the Court viewed the competing
interests when it first sighted the "right of association" as an independ-
ent right in the 1958 case of NAACP v. Alabama, ex rel Patterson.41 In
the latter case the State of Alabama had sought to have the NAACP
enjoined from operating within the state since it had not complied with
the statute requiring foreign corporations to qualify to do business
within the state. As a part of the discovery proceedings in the action
the state obtained a court order that the NAACP produce all of its
membership lists; NAACP officials refused to fully comply and were
found in contempt.
42
The Court stated in its decision that the individual members of the
group had a constitutionally protected "right of association," for the
protection of which the organization itself was a suitable plaintiff, since
the association itself would be damaged by the forced production of the
lists. This right was applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.43
Justice Harlan first tied this right to the freedoms of speech and
assembly:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particu-
larly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group associa-
tion, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon
the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly....
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the ad-
vancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "lib-
erty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
36. Id. at 669. See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
37. 268 U.S. at 672.
38. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
39. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394-400 (1950).
40. Id.
41. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
42. Id. at 452-54.
43. Id. at 458-60.
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Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.
44
Thus the right of association was initially expressed as being derived
from the other first amendment guarantees. However, further along in
the opinion, Justice Harlan referred to the right independently as the
"right of petitioner's members to associate freely,"45 and as one of
"these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or
association.
'46
The Court then found a factual basis to support the conclusion
that compliance with the membership production order would interfere
with this right of association in that publication of the membership lists
would expose the members of the group to retaliation from hostile
members of the community. 47 The Court analyzed the State of Ala-
bama's interest in requiring the production of the lists, and found it to
be inadequate, on balance, to justify the resulting infringement of asso-
ciational rights.48
The NAACP's efforts to secure civil rights for black people pro-
duced other Supreme Court cases on the same issue. In Bates v. City of
Little Rock,4 9 the Court held that two municipal ordinances which re-
quired the production of membership lists by "fraternal organizations"
as part of a licensing tax would cause an impermissible infringment of
NAACP members' right of association. The Court used an analysis
similar to that in Patterson, finding that the production of membership
lists would have a serious negative effect on the ability of NAACP
members to associate freely.50 Such an effect could not be justified by
the state's interest in obtaining the lists as part of a taxing scheme. The
Court stated that the matter would turn "on whether the cities as in-
strumentalities of the State have demonstrated so cogent an interest in
obtaining and making public the membership list of these organiza-
tions as to justify the substantial abridgment of associational freedom
which such disclosures will effect."' 5' "Where there is a significant en-
croachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon
showing a subordinating interest which is compelling. ' 52
44. Id. at 460.
45. Id. at 461.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 462. The court cited past occurrences of "economic reprisal, loss of employ-
ment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility."
48. 357 U.S. at 463-66.
49. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
50. The Court found that NAACP members would be subjected to the same manifesta-
tions of hostility as those considered in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson. 1d. at 524.
51. Id.
52. Id
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Both prevailing and dissenting opinions in cases following Bates
and Patterson reiterated the existence of an independent first amend-
ment "right of association," variously allying it to the express free
speech guarantee,53 the "liberty" assured by the fourteenth amendment
against state action,5 4 the "bundle of First Amendment rights" 55 or
"part of the periphery of the First Amendment, ' 56 "one of those liber-
ties which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile," 57 "implicit in
the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition,"58 or that which "goes
with" speech, assembly, and petition.59 In his opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut,60 Justice Douglas expanded on the underlying rationale
for the necessity of the creation of a right of association:
The right of "association," like the right of belief ... is more than
the right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one's
attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation
with it or by other lawful means. Association in that context is a
form of expression of opinion; and while it is not expressly included
in the First Amendment its existence is necessary to making the ex-
press guarantees fully meaningful 6
Whether implicit in the first amendment or part of its periphery,
the articulation of a right of association is a pragmatic recognition that
the first amendment freedoms, if extended only to individuals, are
often meaningless. The gathering together of those with similar
thoughts allows ideas to be refined and presented for consideration by
the public with a voice loud enough to be heard. Bates and Patterson
each examined a seemingly innocuous and legitimate regulation, that
on its face evidenced no impairment of first amendment rights, but rec-
ognized that in fact the regulation dealt a severe blow to such rights
with a negligible benefit accruing to the state.62 The Court has looked
to the substantive effect of the regulations challenged and balanced the
impairment of associational rights against the interest of the state pos-
53. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960) (Stewart, J.).
54. Id. at 497. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961).
56. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 568-69 (1963).
57. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
58. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972).
59. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); see Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S.
17, 25 (1968).
60. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
61. Id. at 483 (emphasis added). The Court in Griswold is creating a right to privacy,
using the creation of the right of association as a model.
62. Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918) ("Acts generally
lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end. . . and a constitu-
tional power cannot be used by way of a condition to attain an unconstitutional result.").
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ited as the reason for the regulation. In Patterson and Bates emphasis
was placed on the disparity in relationship between the state power
which is being exercised-the power to regulate corporations and to
tax, respectively-and the means employed in the exercise of that
power-the production of lists of the rank and file membership. In
both cases the means employed would have had the effect of destroying
the associations.
63
A similar question of organizational membership disclosure arose
when the State of Arkansas sought to require every schoolteacher to list
all organizations to which he or she had belonged or contributed within
the last five years. In Shelton v. Tucker64 the Court confirmed that Ar-
kansas had a substantive interest in inquiring into the fitness and com-
petency of its teachers, but stated that "[i]t is not disputed that to
compel a teacher to disclose his every associational tie is to impair that
teacher's right of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of
speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a
free society."' 65 The Court compared the purposes of the disclosure act
with the potential for damage to associational rights, noted that "even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved," struck
the balance in favor of associational rights, and invalidated the act.
66
Subsequent cases found the balance in various places, more often
in favor of the "right to association" than not, though some interests of
the state were found to justify what was considered to be incidental
interference with the associational rights of members of the Communist
Party. In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee67 the
Court applied the balancing test to a conflict between the State's broad
legislative power to investigate subversive activities and the individ-
ual's right of association, noting that when that power infringed the
right substantially, "[tihe delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts
to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the rea-
sons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the
rights . ,"68 In this case the Court found that the possibility of com-
munist infiltration of the Miami branch of the NAACP did not justify
63. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1958); Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-25 (1960).
64. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
65. Id. at 485-86.
66. Id. at 488-90.
67. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
68. Id. at 545 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
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the requirement that that group divulge information about its contribu-
tors and supporters when the Florida Legislative Committee did not
already have adequate evidence that such infiltration had occurred,
since there must be an "adequate foundation" to justify intrustions, by
a legislative body, into "the constitutional privilege to be secure in as-
sociations in legitimate organizations engaged in the exercise of First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights .... -69
The Patterson case returned to the Court as NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel Flowers70 and the Court held that even though an Alabama court
had found some of the NAACP's actions in that State to be in violation
of state law, the penalty of complete exclusion from the state unduly
infringed the group's constitutional right of association.7' No matter
how legitimate the state regulatory interest, the means of achieving it
could not "sweep unnecessarily broadly" into the area of protected
freedoms.
72
In United States v. Robe?' 3 the Court found that even the federal
government's great interest in preventing sabotage and espionage in de-
fense plants could not be achieved by a means which was "too ex-
treme." 74 Here a section of the Subversive Activities Control Act75
imposed a criminal penalty on anyone who belonged to a "communist-
action" organization and who willfully held employment in a defense
plant. The Court pointed out that this law infringed individuals' asso-
ciational rights in that it required a person who belonged to the Com-
munist Party to give up either his Party membership or his job, even if
his membership did not pose an actual threat to defense-plant
security.76
The principles of these cases were applied to the alleged denial of
associational rights on college campuses in Healy v. James.77 Here, the
Court confronted the distinction between speech and conduct in con-
sidering the denial by a state supported college of recognition to a local
chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society. This campus recog-
nition, usually routinely granted, was denied by the college president,
who believed that "the group would be a 'disruptive influence' at [the
69. Id. at 558.
70. 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
71. Id. at 308.
72. Id. at 307.
73. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
74. Id. at 265.
75. 50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1970).
76. 389 U.S. at 264-65.
77. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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school] and that recognition would be 'contrary to the orderly process
of change' on the campus. ' 7 He held this belief despite the fact that
the hearing examiner's record, on which he based his opinion, con-
tained no substantial evidence that the local SDS members would be
disruptive.
79
Noting that denial of the application was a form of prior restraint,
the Court placed a heavy burden on the college to justify denial of a
properly filed application, for recognition would aid the group in
achieving its associational purposes by permitting use of college facili-
ties for meetings, bulletin boards for communicating with other stu-
dents, and the right to apply for college funds.80
Of the four reasons given for nonrecognition, the Court rejected
three as inappropriate. Denial due to the loose affiliation of the local
SDS chapter with the national organization abrogated their right solely
on the basis of association with an unpopular organization. President
James' disagreement with the group's philosophy, as expressed in an
alumni magazine statement, and his conclusion that "'prospective
campus activities were likely to cause a disruptive influence' ",8 were
likewise rejected as appropriate reasons for nonrecognition. In re-
jecting the last justification, the Court pointed out that the "line hereto-
fore drawn for determining the permissibility of regulation is the line
between mere advocacy and advocacy 'directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such
action.' Brandenburg v. Ohio."82 This fear of disruption having no ba-
sis in the record, the Court quoted its statement in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District83 that an " 'undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance. . . is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression.'"
On the other hand, the college could impose reasonable campus
regulations controlling conduct, and the Court held that to require ad-
herence to reasonable rules not directed at the content of the group's
message would not be an infringement of associational rights, nor
would denial of recognition infringe associational rights if the group
reserved the right to violate campus regulations.
84
78. Id. at 179.
79. Id. at 190-91.
80. Id. at 176.
81. Id. at 185-88.
82. Id. at 188 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
83. 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
84. 408 U.S. at 193.
[Vol. 30
HOMOSEXUAL ORGANIZATIONS
Healy represents a major development in the application of the
Court's balancing test to associational rights by unequivocally placing
the content of the group's message outside of the balance. No abridg-
ment of the group's associational rights will be tolerated if the only
competing interest is the State's opposition to the content of that
speech.
Following Healy, the Court in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,85 in
the context of desegregation of recreational facilities, pointed out that
the exercise of freedom of association is largely dependent on the right
to own or use property, so that any denial of access to public facilities
must withstand close scrutiny and be closely circumscribed.
86
In cases where the application of the balancing test went against
the right of association, the Court found that the governmental interest
was a very great one, and concluded that the means chosen to effectu-
ate that purpose were no broader than was necessary under the circum-
stances. In Scales v. United States87 the Smith Act, which imposed
criminal sanctions for membership in an organization advocating the
overthrow of the government by force and violence provided the de-
fendant knew the purpose of the organization, was found "not [to] cut
deeper into the freedom of association than is necessary to deal with
'the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.' "88 In Com-
munist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,89 upholding provi-
sions of the Internal Security Act requiring Communist-action groups
to register with the Attorney General and disclose details of the organi-
zation, the Court held that because of the "magnitude of the public
interests which the registration and disclosure provisions are designed
to protect and ... the pertinence which registration and disclosure
bear to the protection of those interests," 90 the Act did not violate first
amendment association rights, even though the Communist Party had
not been found by the board to be engaged either in inciting the present
use of force or in advocacy that could be prosecuted under the Smith
Act. The Court concluded, however, that disclosure may, in certain
circumstances, infringe constitutionally protected rights of
association. 9'
85. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
86. Id. at 575.
87. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
88. Id. at 228-30 (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
89. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
90. Id. at 93.
91. Id. at 89-95.
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In spite of the general successes for associational rights in these
cases, one commentator, in a review of the cases in which the Court has
applied the doctrine, finds that the adhoc balancing formula applied to
these situations provides very little concrete protection. 92 He points to
the fact that the term "right of association" is broad and undefined and
contends that the other issues that are always presented in association
cases render a "right of association" analysis of dubious utility when it
comes to protecting first amendment rights. Perhaps this opinion is in-
fluenced by the fact that the extent of protection of that right has so
often depended on the Court's determination of the relative dangerous-
ness of the group in question, a determination often based upon Con-
gressional findings contained in various legislative acts.93 A review of
the cases shows that the NAACP's right of association has been uni-
formly protected even if only narrowly, as in the 5-4 decision in Bates,
while the right of association of Communist Party members has re-
ceived a more uneven treatment.
94
That the right of association doctrine has a wider application than
just political groups is clear, for, along with the generally accepted right
of association to advance political beliefs, 95 the Court has "protected
forms of 'association' that are not political in the customary sense but
pertain to the social, legal and economic benefit of the members."
96
The right of association has been applied to activities which "express"
the aims of the members through the financing and solicitation of liti-
gation,97 to the right of persons in public housing projects to organize
tenants' associations,98 and to the right of association for social
purposes. 99
92. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 14
(1964).
93. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 4-19,
36, 56 (1961).
94. See text accompanying notes 116-65 infra.
95. Eg., Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 449 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes.
393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967).
96. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
97. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois
State Bar Assoc., 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar,
377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
98. Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
99. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
See also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). "The freedom to associate
applies to the beliefs we share, and to those we consider reprehensible. It tends to produce
the diversity of opinion that oils the machinery of democratic government .... Id. at
575.
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Types of Interference with Associational Rights that Will
Invoke the Protection of the First Amendment
In examining which types of interference will invoke the protec-
tion of the First Amendment, the Court has emphasized that the practi-
cal effects of governmental actions on associational rights must be
examined, even when the interference is indirect and subtle: "Freedoms
such as these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal at-
tack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interfer-
ence." 00 Patterson emphasized that an interference which is both
indirect and unintentional may violate associational rights:
The fact that Alabama ... has taken no direct action ... to restrict
the right of petitioner's members to associate freely, does not end
inquiry into the effect of the production order .... In the domain of
these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association,
the decisions of this Court recognize that abridgment of such rights,
even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of
governmental action.10'
In the same opinion, the Court went on to say that the interference with
associational rights need not be the direct result of the governmental
action. Here the repressive effect of compulsory disclosure of member-
ship lists was expected to result from acts of private individuals, but the
Court said that "[t]he crucial factor is the interplay of governmental
and private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power
represented by the production order that private action takes hold." 0 2
The interferences with associational rights of which the Court has
taken cognizance include: ostensibly harmless business regulations, 103
the exercise of legislative investigative power, 1°4 the exclusion of indi-
viduals from public facilities, 10 5 state regulations meant to control pro-
fessional misconduct by lawyers, 0 6 the denial of benefits to student
groups, 17 requirements that an individual divulge the names of the or-
ganizations to which he or she belongs, 08 and the exclusion of an or-
ganization from doing business in a state. 10 9 In all of these examples
100. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960).
101. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
102. Id. at 463.
103. Eg., Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
104. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
105. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
106. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
107. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
108. E.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
109. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
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the resulting restriction of associational rights was incidental to, but
clearly flowed from, the stated purpose of the governmental action in
question. In some of these examples the cause and effect relationship
between the governmental action and the resulting infringement of as-
sociation has been quite attenuated.
The Right of Association
Student Organizations
The holding in Healy v. James1 0 covered so thoroughly the issues
surrounding recognition of campus organizations that the rights of stu-
dent organizations would appear to have been settled. State colleges
and universities "[a]re not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment.""' The Court declared in Healy that "[t]he College, act-
ing here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or
association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to
be abhorrent."' 1 2 A "fear or apprehension" of disruption on the cam-
pus is not a sufficient basis for non-recognition, in the absence of sub-
stantial evidence that that disruption would in fact occur. Recognition
may be denied, however, if the group refuses to state itself willing to
abide by reasonable school rules governing the time, place and manner
of conduct." 13 The propriety of nonrecognition could also be consid-
ered if there were evidence, coming from the organization's activities
rather than its philosophy, that it would engage in "advocacy 'directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and .. likely to incite
or produce such action.' "114 The Court pointed out that in the context
of a campus, "lawless action" would include actions which materially
disrupt the work of the school, as well as criminal acts.
1 5
A right of association analysis has resulted in several federal court
rulings favorable to homosexual student organizations. In Gay Students
Organization of University of New Hampshire v. Bonner,116 right of as-
sociation principles were applied to the refusal by University of New
Hampshire officials to permit the GSO to hold social functions on cam-
pus. Official recognition had been granted in 1973, but the media at-
110. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
111. Id. at 180. See Rivera, supra note 6, at 1215-25.
112. Id. at 187-88.
113. Id. at 191-93.
114. Id. at 188 (emphasis added) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969)).
115. Id. at 189.
116. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
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tention given to a dance held on campus caused the Board of Trustees
to reexamine the organization's campus status after Governor Meldrim
Thompson, Jr. strongly criticized the University's recognition of the
group. The GSO's challenge to the resulting restrictions upon on-cam-
pus activities, broadly defined as social activities, was sustained by the
district court and the regulations condemned as a violation of the first
amendment right of association." 7 The University appealed. The
First Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Frank M. Coffin,
affirmed." i8
The University claimed that by granting recognition and permit-
ting meetings it had met its first amendment obligation and could pro-
hibit "purely social" activities that it felt were distasteful to the citizens
of New Hampshire, undermined support for the University, and were
not among the class of protected associational activities." 9 Examining
this contention, the court found that social events, in which an informal
discussion and exchange of ideas could take place, played an important
part in furthering the purposes of the organization, and thus the Uni-
versity's objections to the social events, labeled an abomination by de-
fendants, were content related.1 20 The court cited Wood v. Davison'
2 '
for the proposition that Healy v. James had been "interpreted to extend
to the use of campus facilities"' 22 by homosexual groups, as Healy said
clearly that "the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct inter-
ference with fundamental rights."
12 3
In analyzing the facts in Bonner the court recognized that the issue
of recognition, per se, was "isolated and for the most part irrelevant,"
and that the "ultimate issue at which inquiry must be directed is the
effect which a regulation has on organizational and associational activ-
ity."'124 While rejecting the district court's contention that the more
traditional rights of freedom of speech and assembly had not been
117. Gay Students Organization of the Univ. of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 367 F.
Supp. 1088, 1095 (D.N.H.), affrd, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
118. Gay Students Organization of the Univ. of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d
652 (1st Cir. 1974).
119. Id. at 659-61.
120. Id. at 661. No showing had been made that the restrictions were the result of vio-
lence, disruption, or other illegal acts. Id. at 661-62.
121. 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972). The plaintiffs in Wood successfully sued the
University of Georgia to permit a homosexual rights conference, including a social event, to
be held on campus by a recognized campus organization. The court held that denial of the
permit infringed the constitutional rights of assembly, speech, and association.
122. 509 F.2d at 659 (emphasis added).
123. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972)(emphasis added).
124. 509 F.2d at 659.
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abused, the circuit court read Healy as focusing on the "practicalities of
human interaction."1 25 The real effect, then, of the University's "no
socials" regulation would be to impair individual members' ability to
express their group membership and their associational ties, not just
their ability to express personal convictions. These ties are often ex-
pressed in a lecture or discussion that, as the court pointed out, "be-
comes a social event if beer is served beforehand or coffee
afterward." 
26
The Eighth Circuit, in Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 27 reached
a similar result in reversing a lower court opinion which had upheld a
decision by the University of Missouri to deny recognition to a group
organized as Gay Lib, whose basic purpose was to provide a forum for
the discussion of homosexuality. The district court's opinion had held,
"from the evidence, that association is likely to incite, promote, and
result in acts contrary to and in violation of the sodomy statute of the
State of Missouri."'' 28 This finding was based upon testimony given by
two psychiatrists who stated that granting recognition would likely re-
sult in an increase in the number of homosexual acts committed in vio-
lation of Missouri law, 129 simply because there would be more contact
among homosexuals. In addition, the lower court reproduced in full
the findings of a hearing officer which concluded, among other things,
that homosexuality was "sick," "an abnormal way of life," "ill and ab-
normal," and that recognition would "tend to cause latent or potential
homosexuals who become members to become overt homosexuals."' 30
125. Id. at 658, 660.
126. Id. at 659-60.
127. 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'g, 416 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
128. Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 416 F. Supp. 1350, 1370 (W.D. Mo. 1976), revd.
558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1276 (1978).
129. Id. at 1368-70. Dr. Harold Moser Voth, in answer to the question of whether he
could give an opinion based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty whether recogni-
tion of the group would tend to cause the state sodomy laws to be broken, testified as fol-
lows, as set forth in the opinion: "In the sense that I said a moment ago that the forming of
an organization would tend to reinforce the personal identity and behavior of the individual,
bringing like people together; in the sense that it would reflect society's implicit, if not ex-
plicit condonement of this organization. Yes, I think it would tend to further homosexual
behavior." Id. at 1368.
Dr. Charles Socarides' testimony in response to the same hypothetical question was also
set forth in the opinion: "I believe that whereveryou have a convocation of homosexuals, that
you are going to have increased homosexual activities, which, of course, includes sodomy. It is
one of the mostprevalent forms of sexual expression in homosexuality. And I know that for a
fact from hearing from my patients, who go to gatherings of homosexuals and where there is
a great deal of cruising and a great deal of picking up of partners. So that any gathering
would certainly promote such sexual conduct." Id. at 1369 (emphasis in original).
130. Id. at 1358-59.
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The University Board of Curators added similar conclusions in its reso-
lution denying recognition.13' The district court believed that the
showing of the probability of increased violation of the criminal sod-
omy statute resulting from recognition met the "imminent lawless ac-
tion" test of Healy.1
32
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the conclusions drawn from
the testimony of the expert witnesses for the defense, Drs. Voth and
Socarides, stating that the defendants' evidence turned on their "con-
clusory 'inference' and. . . 'belief,' for which no historical or empirical
basis is disclosed."'' 3 3 By the time of its decision, in August 1977, the
Eighth Circuit could look to both Gay Students Organization of Univer-
sity of New Hampshire v. Bonner and Gay Alliance of Students v.
Matthews134 for applications of Healy to homosexual rights groups.
The court, in reversing the judgment of the district court, accordingly
pointed out that the lower court had made no finding of advocacy of or
actual present rules violation, or that the presence of Gay Lib on cam-
pus would infringe rules or disrupt classes. 35 Referring to the "avowed
purposes and aims of" the organization, the majority found no advo-
cacy directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action:
It is difficult to singularly ascribe evil connotations to the group sim-
ply because they are homosexuals .... [T]his approach blurs the
constitutional line between mere advocacy and advocacy directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action. Finally, such an ap-
proach smacks of penalizing persons for their status rather than their
conduct, which is constitutionally impermissible.
13 6
Judge Regan and Chief Judge Gibson, each dissenting in Gay Lib,
131. Id. at 1359.
132. Id. at 1370. Such a conclusion can be analogized to denying liquor licenses to
taverns on the grounds that violations of drunk driving laws are sure to occur, or banning
meetings of groups proposing the repeal of anti-abortion laws on the grounds that informa-
tion about illegal abortions is sure to be disseminated there, leading to more illegal abor-
tions, or banning the activities of marijuana reform groups.
133. Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1276 (1978). District Judge Regan, sitting as a member of the panel by designation,
dissented, and the petition for rehearing en banc was denied by an evenly divided court,
with Chief Judge Gibson dissenting from denial of rehearing and Stephenson, J., concur-
ring. Both dissents questioned the majority's refusal to apply the "clearly erroneous" rule
which requires the reviewing court to accept the district court's assessment of conflicting
testimony if there is substantial evidence supporting it, te. "unless clearly erroneous." The
majority held that the rule doesn't apply when evidence is submitted in deposition or docu-
mentary form, as it was here. The district court's finding of fact that recognition of Gay Lib
would increase the commission of crimes was, of course, the linchpin in its holding that
refusal to grant recognition met constitutional standards.
134. 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976).
135. 558 F.2d at 856.
136. Id.
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found ample support for the key finding that recognition would bring
about imminent lawless actions, believing the psychiatric testimony to
be persuasive. Chief Judge Gibson stated: "Given the finding that rec-
ognition of Gay Lib would likely result in imminent violations of Mis-
souri sodomy laws, there is no prior restraint issue in this case ...
[T]he First Amendment does not require a University to extend formal
recognition to a campus organization that will engage in criminal activ-
ity . ,,137 This dissent fails to acknowledge the distinction, which
must be made in some fact situations, between the activities of an or-
ganization and the activities of its individual members. Individual
members could, of course, violate Missouri's antisodomy laws, but such
felonious activity could not be attributed to the organization itself.
38
The majority's finding, however, was based upon the actual stated
purpose of the organization: "Even accepting the opinions of defend-
ants' experts at face value, we find it insufficient to justify a governmen-
tal prior restraint on the right of a group of students to associate for the
purposes avowed in their statement [of purpose]." 139 Nowhere in any
of the opinions in Gay Lib is there an indication that the organization
would engage in any advocacy other than the constitutionally protected
advocacy embraced in its statement of purpose. Indeed, for Gay Lib to
engage in "advocacy directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action" rather than advocacy directed to protecting the status of
homosexuality would require the sponsoring of specific sexual acts or
some event involving sexual acts, which would be contrary to the
group's purpose of establishing a "dialogue between the homosexual
and hetereosexual members of the university community."140 Gibson's
dissent would have the effect of penalizing the status of being
homosexual.
Both dissents in Gay Lib indicate a disturbing willingness to cur-
137. Id. at 860 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
138. This case is not one wherein an organization itself has, following legislative hear-
ings, been found by the legislature to be a subversive organization whose very purpose calls
for illegal acts. See Communist Party of the United States of America v. Subversive Activi-
ties Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1960). This situation is more similar to that of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People in Alabama during the 1960's when the
state could not hope to halt the efforts of each individual Alabamian toward racial equality
and full self-expression but could seek to curtail the activities of these individuals organized
as the NAACP.
139. 558 F.2d at 854. The court stated in an earlier footnote: "Surely, it is no longer a
valid argument to suggest that an organization cannot be formed to peacefully advocate
repeal of certain criminal laws. See Street v. New York 394 U.S. 576, 591 . . . (1969)." Id.
at 856 n.16.
140. Id. at 850.
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tail the extension of the first amendment freedom to homosexual orga-
nizations seeking campus recognition. Although seeming to rely on the
"imminent lawless action" finding of the district court, both statements
clearly indicate an abhorrance of the social or sexual values repre-
sented by the organizations, resulting in a willingness to deny recogni-
tion on the basis of the content of the group's message. Judge Regan's
dissent stated:
Moreover, state university officials have a responsibility ... to
all students on campus, and that responsibility encompasses a right
to protect latent or potential homosexuals from becoming overt ho-
mosexual students. In carrying out these responsibilities, they were
aware that unlike recognition of political associations, whether of the
right, center or left, an organization dedicated to the furtherance and
advancement of homosexuality would, in any realistic sense, cer-
tainly so to impressionistic students, imply approval not only of the
organization per se but of homosexuality and the normality of such
conduct, and thus adversely affect potential homosexual students. In
my opinion, the University was entitled to protect itself and other
students on campus, in this small way, against abnormality, illness
and compulsive conduct of the kind here described in the
evidence. 1
4 1
Similarly, Chief Judge Gibson stated: "These institutions are populated
by young, often impressionable students; school officials have a respon-
sibility to shield these students from exposure to probable illegal con-
duct on the campus."' 42 If there is a distinction between the desire to
shield students from the problem faced by homosexuals and the
problems faced by women seeking abortions or those agitating for ma-
rijuana reform it is certainly unclear. Both judges accept the thesis ex-
pressed by the hearing examiner that homosexuality is an abnormal
sickness and thus are blind to the possibility that a campus homosexual
organization might be conducive to improving the self image and
mental health of homosexuals, "potential" or otherwise, on campus.
The rather blind acceptance of the medical evaluations of homo-
sexuality as a sickness, in the face of conflicting testimony, and the use
of such highly questionable evaluations to apply constitutional princi-
ples to a question before the court indicate a misapprehension of both
facts and law. The majority in Gay Lib correctly pointed out that there
was a "substantial body of professional medical opinion conflicting
with defendants' case" and that there was "no scientific certitude to the
141. Id. at 859 (Regan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 861 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting). For a counter to this argument see Richards,
supra note 17, at 732 n.136.
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opinion offered."' 143 Many questions about the nature, origin or
"cause" of homosexuality are unanswered, but the trend is definitely
away from considering it a sickness. The American Psychiatric Associ-
ation, for example, has removed homosexuality from its list of recog-
nized illnesses. 144 Moreover, the fear of recruitment ignores the stated
informational and educational purposes of Gay Lib, which were aimed
more at a dialogue than at potential homosexual members; the organi-
zation specifically denied any desire "to proselytize, convert, or re-
cruit." 145 The Supreme Court's holding in Brandenburg v. Ohio bears
emphasis: "[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of. . . law viola-
tion except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion." 146 In Gay Lib there was no showing of advocacy of lawless ac-
tion. The dissenting judges, in confusing their own sense of morals
with the law, have forgotten Holmes' comment that "the aim of law is
not to punish sins, but is to prevent certain external results."'' 47 When
crimes occur they may be punished, but the use of medical "experts" to
prove that recognition of a homosexual rights group will increase crime
is unusual and questionable and is possible only because of ignorance
within both the medical and legal professions about the nature and
character of homosexuality and homosexuals. The University sought
to appeal this Court of Appeals decision, but was denied a writ of certi-
orari in Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 148 in an order without an opinion of the
Court. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Blackman, dissented from
the denial.
The issue as Justice Rehnquist expressed it, was "the extent to
which a self-governing democracy, having made certain acts criminal,
may prevent or discourage individuals from engaging in speech or con-
143. Id. at 854.
144. The American Psychiatric Association's Board of Trustees adopted a resolution on
December 15, 1974, which states in part: "[Hiomosexuality per se implies no impairment in
judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities .... " Reprinted
in PORTLAND TowN COUNCIL, A LEGISLATIVE GUIDE TO GAY RIGHTS 26 (1976). See
Richards, supra note 17, at 727 n. 117.
145. 558 F.2d at 851 n.4.
146. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The Court's use of the word "di-
rected" seems to indicate language which "points to" or "is designed to," or "intended to"
produce imminent lawless action. Thus it might be concluded that the Court would require
an element of intent to produce imminent lawless action on the part of the speaker for there
to be criminal liability or conduct outside constitutional protection.
147. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 20, 48 N.E. 770, 770 (1897).
148. 98 S. Ct. 1276 (1978).
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duct which encourages others to violate those laws." 149 Rehnquist
stated that behind the procedural question surrounding the applicabil-
ity of the "clearly erroneous" test lurks "the inevitable clash between
the authority of a State to prevent subversion of the lawful rules of
conduct which it has enacted pursuant to its police power and the right
of individuals under the first and fourteenth amendments who disagree
with various of those rules to urge that they be changed through demo-
cratic processes."
'150
In this "inevitable clash," however, the first amendment is plainly
on the side of those seeking to alter the status quo, unless their message
is directed to incitement of imminent lawless action. Rehnquist appar-
ently believes that in Ratchford, unlike in Heay, there was a successful
attempt "to demonstrate that imminent lawless action was likely as a
result of the speech in question.''51 Expanding upon the "likely" lan-
guage of the District Court's findings, he asks "whether a university can
deny recognition to an organization the activities of which expert psy-
chologists testify will in and of themselves lead directly to viola-
tions"152 of state criminal statutes.
With the Eighth Circuit's rejection of the District Court's finding
that the "association is likely to incite, promote and result in acts con-
trary to and in violation of the sodomy statute,"' 53 the basis upon
which Rehnquist would deny recognition falls. Brandenburg permits
the state to proscribe only that advocacy that is "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely' 154 to do so. Rehnquist
nevertheless refers to Brandenburg in support of the proposition that
"some speech that has a propensity to induce action prohibited by the
criminal laws may itself be prohibited."'' 55 Beyond his willingness to
uphold the denial of recognition based upon the District Court's "likely
to incite" finding he appears alarmingly willing to lower the
Brandenburg standard to a mere "propensity to induce actions."' 56
Rehnquist confuses the distinction between the homosexual act
149. Id. at 1277-78.
150. Id. at 1278.
151. Id. at 1279.
152. Id.
153. Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 416 F. Supp. 1350, 1370 (W.D. Mo. 1976), rev'd,
558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1276 (1978).
154. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added); see note 146
supra.
155. 98 S. Ct. at 1279 (emphasis added).
156. Id.
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and homosexuality as a status. He sets forth the analogy that, to the
University,
the question is. . .whether those suffering from measles have a con-
stitutional right, in violation of quarantine regulations, to associate
together and with others who do not presently have measles, in order
to urge repeal of a state law providing that measle sufferers be quar-
antined. The very act of assemblage under these circumstances un-
dercuts a significant interest of the State which a plea for the repeal
of the law would in no wise do.
15 7
Apparently Rehnquist feels that homosexuals may speak individually
for legal change, but, should they meet together, the disease might be
contagious. There are, however, no laws akin to quarantine regulations
which make it illegal for homosexuals to gather together; such laws
would be unconstitutional as penalizing a status rather than an act.
Community Organization
When the Rhode Island Bicentennial Commission refused to grant
the application of the Toward A Gayer Bicentennial Committee for use
of the Old State House for a "Congress of People with Gay Concerns,"
and other projects centered around the Committee's observation of
1976 Gay Pride Week, the principles of Healy v. James were applied to
overturn the Commission's refusal. 58 The Bicentennial Commission
denied the Committee's request on rather vague grounds, citing its
"wide latitude in the exercise of its discretion in determining what pro-
posals are sufficiently in keeping with the bicentennial themes to war-
rant endorsement."'' 59 Endorsement of projects granted access, subject
to prior reservation, to the Old State House which the defendant Com-
mission argued was not a public forum but a "valuable governmental
benefit analogous to nontenured state employment. . . which the gov-
ernment may deny on any number of grounds in the reasonable exer-
cise of its discretion."' 60 The court disagreed, and concluded that the
Commission had created a limited public forum for activities related to
a bicentennial theme and that the Commission must either grant the
Committee endorsement (and hence access) or promulgate "precise
and clear standards [which could be] even-handedly applied."' 6' The
Commission having chosen to make the Old State House available only
for endorsed projects, the prerequisite of endorsement upon which ex-
157. Id. at 1278-79.
158. Toward A Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation,
417 F. Supp. 632 (D.R.I. 1976).
159. Id. at 637.
160. Id. (footnote omitted).
161. Id. at 640.
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ercise of first amendment rights was conditioned could not be consid-
ered a mere "stamp of approval."' 62 Its issuance was subject to the
rigorous scrutiny of any governmental restraint on free speech.
In its review of the Commission's second denial of the Commit-
tee's request to use the Old State House, following promulgation of a
set of supplementary standards, the court found the reasoning that
"'endorsement would involve approval'" to be "totally unaccept-
able."' 163 It reiterated the statement in its earlier opinion that, because
the Commission had decided to condition access to the forum on en-
dorsement, it could not condition expression of first amendment rights
on agreement or approval of them; "government officials may not re-
strict access to a public forum simply because they disagree with, or
disapprove of, the views to be expressed there."'164 The court's vindica-
tion of the associational and speech rights of the Toward A Gayer Bi-
centennial Committee was somewhat hollow as the second decision,
which granted the Committee use of the Old State House from 9:30
a.m. until 11:00 p.m. on Saturday, June 26, 1976, was issued on Friday,
June 25.165
Publicizing the Association
In 1969166 the Society for Individual Rights, 167 in order to reach
more of the estimated 90,000 homosexuals 68 in the San Francisco area
with its counseling and legal services, attempted to place this advertise-
ment with its listing under "Associations" in the Yellow Pages section
of the telephone book: "Homosexuals, know and protect your rights. If
162. Id. (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 182 (1972)).
163. Toward A Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation
(II), 417 F. Supp. 642, 645 (D.R.I. 1976).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 647.
166. The date is important in that it precedes the 1975 adoption of legislation in Califor-
nia which legalized sexual acts between consenting adults, the Willie Brown Consensual Sex
Act Bill, Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 71, §§ 4-12, at 133-36 (codified in scattered sections of CAL.
PENAL CODE).
167. SIR, founded in San Francisco in 1974, sought to end discrimination against homo-
sexuals by instilling in them a sense of dignity and self-respect, as well as pursuing political
action. SIR and its members (which included Rick Stokes, David Clayton, Jim Foster and
David Goodstein) provided the long term effort which resulted in the passage in California
of the Willie Brown Consensual Sex Act Bill. See note 166 supra. See also Licata, The
Emerging Gay Presence (pt. 2), The Advocate, July 26, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
168. Council on Religion and the Homosexual, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 70 Cal.
P.U.C. 471, 478 (1969) (Gatov, Comm'r, dissenting).
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over twenty-one write or visit Society for Individual Rights .... "169
SIR proved at hearing that it received approximately 115 telephone
calls per month requesting referrals for legal, religious, psychiatric and
medical assistance, suicide prevention, and other matters, and that the
proffered advertisement had been published in the San Francisco
Chronicle, a daily newspaper of general circulation. 17
0
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph refused to accept the advertise-
ment on the grounds that it was offensive to good taste and would be
found offensive by most directory users. It introduced letters from
some thirty-eight subscribers supporting its position as well as the testi-
mony of the past president of the San Francisco Council of Women's
Clubs to the effect that the advertisement was offensive. 17 1 P.T. & T.
admitted that its copy standards might be more restrictive than most,
but pointed out that, unlike a newspaper carrying offensive advertise-
ments, a telephone book cannot conveniently be thrown away.'7 2 P.T.
& T. thus invoked its tariff schedule, Tariff No. 39-T, regarding accept-
ability of advertising, which provided that advertisements that are of-
fensive to good taste "in direct representation or by suggestion in text
or illustration" would not be accepted.
73
SIR argued that P.T. & T.'s Tariff No. 39-T and its standard for
acceptability of advertising were unconstitutional and as applied in this
case had abridged the group's constitutional right to free speech and
equal protection of the laws. The Public Utilities Commission denied
SIR's petition in Societyfor Individual Rights v. Pacific Telephone & Tel-
egraph Co., relying on the fact that the California Supreme Court had
denied the petition for a writ of review in the earlier case of Council on
Religion and the Homosexual, Inc. v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 174 which had challenged the same tariff provision. Because, under
California law, review of PUC decisions is within the exclusive juris-
diction of the Supreme Court, 175 a denial of a petition for a writ of
review, even if unaccompanied by an opinion, is a decision on the mer-
its as to the law and the facts of the case. 1
76
169. Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 Cal. P.U.C. 622, 622
(1970).
170. Id. at 623-25.
171. Id. at 623-24.
172. Id. at 623.
173. Id. at 624.
174. See note 168 supra.
175. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1759 (West 1975).
176. Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 Cal. P.U.C. 622, 625
(1970).
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In Council on Religion and the Homosexual, four organizations
77
had tried to get a classified directory heading, "Homophile Organiza-
tions," and, when refused this, had complained to the PUC that they
had been the victims of discrimination. 178 P.T. & T.'s sales supervisor
testified that the reason the requested listing had been turned down was
that the classification was too limited, and that he had no objection to
the use of the words "homophile" or "homosexual" as such. 179 The
PUC concluded that P.T. & T. had done nothing improper in refusing
the requested listing, on the basis that the desired listing was too nar-
row.18 0 One dissenting Commissioner pointed out, however, that three
vendors of pencils had been granted a Yellow Pages heading of their
own to distinguish them from "Stationers," and that other specialized
clubs and organizations had been given their own listings.'
81
Two findings of fact were made by the Commission in denying the
complaint: that the heading sought was properly refused as being too
limited, and that the refusal was not arbitrary, discriminatory, unjust,
unreasonable or improper. 82 The conclusion in Society for Individual
Rights that the application of P.T. & T.'s "good taste" standard to
SIR's advertisement was constitutional is questionable at best when the
Supreme Court's denial of the writ of review in Council on Religion and
the Homosexual could easily have been on the grounds that P.T. & T.'s
business judgment was acceptable and nondiscriminatory. The PUC's
holding ignores the substantial differences in the two cases. P.T. & T.
may have broad discretion concerning when to set up a separate
classification, and cannot give a special heading to everyone who wants
one, but to refuse a paid advertisement because of its content raises a
different issue. The latter is not a commercial decision but censorship
and, as the product of "state action," is subject to the equal protection
177. The Council on Religion and the Homosexual, Inc. (an association of church lead-
ers and members, both homosexual and heterosexual, and homosexuals, which sought to
promote understanding and acceptance of homosexuals by religious denominations), Tavern
Guild of San Francisco, Inc. (an association of the owners, managers, and employees of
drinking and dining establishments catering to the gay community), The Daughters of
Bilitis, Inc. (an association devoted to informing and educating the public about homosexu-
ality among women), and the Society for Individual Rights. See note 167 supra. See also
Licata, The Emerging Gay Presence (pt. 2), The Advocate, July 26, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
178. 70 Cal. P.U.C. at 472.
179. Id. at 473.
180. Id. at 474.
181. Id. at 476-77. Commissioner Vukasin, concurring, confused criminal conduct with
counseling and assistance to homosexuals and working to change the laws regarding homo-
sexuality, stating that the listing would "require Pacific to make [the Yellow Pages] available
for illegal activities." .d. at 475.
182. Id. at 474.
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guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. 8 3
A dissenting Commissioner in Society for Individual Rights
pointed out that P.T. & T.'s local Yellow Pages included many adver-
tisements for "topless and bottomless" night clubs, some with illustra-
tions, and six pages of massage parlor ads, and concluded that P.T. &
T. has no reasonable standards by which it measures good taste.'8 4 The
offensiveness of SIR's ad appears to be its mere mention of homosexu-
ality and its implied assertion that homosexuals have a right to secure
their civil rights.
The refusal by P.T. & T. to print an advertisement, based on con-
tent, is a denial of SIR's right of association and freedom of speech. By
virtue of the PUC's explicit approval of the regulated utility's action the
denial of the advertisement constitutes state action 8 5 and hence brings
the infringement under the aegis of the fourteenth amendment. The
effect of the refusal to accept the ad is the decreased ability of the or-
ganization to contact prospective members. This violates the associa-
tional rights of both the present members of the organization and the
183. See Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). In Pollak, the Court
found "sufficient Federal Government action to make the First and Fifth Amendments ap-
plicable thereto" where the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, "pursu-
ant to protests against the radio program [broadcasted by a street railway company in its
passenger vehicles], ordered an investigation of it and, after formal public hearings, ordered
its investigation dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and convenience
were not impaired thereby." 1d. at 462-63.
See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). The finding of no
state action in Jackson, id. at 358-59, is based, inter alia, upon the finding that the Public
Utilities Commission "never even considered the reinsertion of [the termination] provision
in the newly filed general tariff," id. at 355, thus distinguishing the passive acquiescence of
the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission from the active investigation by the District of
Columbia Public Utilities Commission leading to approval of the practice challenged in
Pollak. The Court stated in Jackson that "[a]pproval by a state utility commission of such a
request from a regulated utility, where the commission has not put its own weight on the
side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the
utility and approved by the commission into 'state action.'" Id. at 357. See the cogent
comments on this subject in the dissents by Douglas, J., id. at 359-64, and Marshall, J., id. at
365-74.
See also the holding by the Fourth Circuit in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 1971), where, to avoid federal antitrust viola-
tions, VEPCO successfully argued that its actions in reducing costs for underground trans-
mission lines to contractors who built all-electric houses were exempt from federal antitrust
legislation because acceptance of its rates by the Virginia State Corporation Commission
constituted state action. The Court expressly denied Washington Gas Light's contention
that the lack of affirmative approval made the action "individual" rather than "state" action.
See also Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
184. 71 Cal. P.U.C. 622, 627.
185. See note 183 supra.
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prospective members who will not be able to find it. The content of the
ad clearly indicates that this group is engaged in the protection of civil
rights, a "political" activity of the sort for which the protection of the
first amendment right of association most often has been invoked. The
infringement of rights of the present memberg is analogous to Healy v.
James,186 in which the denial of access to campus bulletin boards for
the purpose of contacting potential members was found to be an
abridgment of associational rights of the group. The rights of the pro-
spective members of the organization who cannot contact it are also
affected; many homosexuals who are interested in knowing their rights
may be prevented from associating with those who would help them.
In the determination of any right of association question the inter-
est behind the governmental action must be balanced against the detri-
ment caused to associational rights. P.T. & T., a commercial enterprise,
claims the need to attract advertisers who might be so offended by
SIR's ad that they would refuse to advertise there. This claim, how-
ever, is unrealistic. The benefits of a listing in the classified directory
are too great, and the alternative too limited. The monopoly of the
telephone company, natural or otherwise, 187 leaves the advertiser-sub-
scriber no alternative method of reaching the audience. P.T. & T. also
testified that the reason that it must have stringent standards of good
taste is that, unlike a newspaper or magazine which can be thrown
away if it offends, the telephone directory is a tool that is essential to
good telephone service, and can't be cast out by a subscriber without
resulting detriment to that service.' 88 However, the Supreme Court in
Healy v. James189 and the district courts in To ward a Gayer Bicentennial
Committee v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation 190 and Gay Students
Organization of University of New Hampshire v. Bonner'91 emphasized
that a majority belief that a message conveyed by a group is "abhor-
rent" will not justify governmental action abridging associational
rights. Additionally, as in the student organization cases, the availabil-
ity of other means of advertising should not influence the issue. No
substitute exists for such a widely used service as the telephone book
classified directory.
186. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
187. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-52, 359-63 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), 366-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (1974).
188. Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 Cal. P.U.C. 622, 623
(1970).
189. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
190. 417 F. Supp. 642 (D.R.I. 1976).
191. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
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In a similar case, Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock,192 a fed-
eral appellate court refused to compel the publication in a state univer-
sity newspaper of a proferred paid advertisement and an
announcement of meetings by the Mississippi Gay Alliance, 93 some of
whose members were students, on the grounds that the first amendment
prohibited such an interference with an editorial decision. To reach
this decision the Court first determined that no state action was in-
volved, because, although the newspaper was supported by university
funds, the university officials exercised no veto authority over the edito-
rial decisions of the student-elected editor. 194 The Court then went on
to explain that there were "special reasons" for holding that there was
no abuse of discretion by the student editor, since he had a right to
avoid even peripheral involvement with off-campus, homosexually re-
lated activity in light of Mississippi's sodomy statute. ' 95 One judge was
of the opinion that the offer of "legal aid" in the tendered advertise-
ment was open to the interpretation that criminal activity was
contemplated. 1
96
The majority's premises collapse under closer scrutiny, particu-
larly upon expansion of an analogy touched upon by Judge Irving L.
Goldberg in his lengthy and well-reasoned dissent. 197 He suggests that
in a similar situation, where a student newspaper was supported by
mandatory fees, the court would not hesitate to find state action to re-
view a decision by a student editor to exclude blacks from the staff.' 98
Consider the situation, in a period mercifully gone with the wind,
where a local chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (which might
include student as well as nonstudent members) submits an advertise-
ment urging interested persons to contact the CORE office, in a year in
which Mississippi state law requires segregation of the races in public
192. 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977).
193. Text of the ad: "Gay center--open 6:00 to 9:00 Monday, Wednesday and Friday
nights.
"We offer--counseling, legal aid and a library of homosexual literature.
"Write to-The Mississippi Gay Alliance, P.O. Box 1328, Mississippi State University,
MS. 39762." Id. at 1074 (emphasis added by the court).
194. Id. at 1075.
195. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-57 (1972) states: "Every person who shall be convicted of
the detestable and abominable crime against nature committed with mankind or with a
beast, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not more than ten
years."
196. 536 F.2d at 1076 n.4.
197. Id. at 1076-90 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). See also Lee v. Board of Regents, 441
F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971).
198. This issue is discussed in 536 F.2d at 1085 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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accommodations. Might a newspaper supported with state funds
choose to reject such an advertisement because the purpose of CORE
was to change the laws? Such "content" censorship, based not on the
threat of "imminent lawless action,"' 99 would strike at the heart of the
democratic process, the right to associate to urge peaceful change in
laws found to be oppressive. The same principle would apply were the
CORE advertisements rejected under the rationale that the newspaper
should be permitted to avoid "even peripheral" involvement with chal-
lenges to segregation laws.200
On the state action question in Goudelock, the fact that there was
no active involvement by the school officials in the decision to reject the
advertisement should be no more dispositive of the issue than was the
lack of active involvement by the state authorities in the discriminatory
service policies of the restaurant in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority.20 ' That the paper's financing came from the student fees
"suggestfs] that the imprimatur of the state is clearly stamped on the
paper."20
2
The Goudelock court relied on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo203 for the premise that a private newspaper could not be com-
pelled to print material submitted to it. Query, however, whether any
reasonable person could consider the school-supported newspaper in
question here, the Reflector, in the same category as the private,
profit-making periodical considered in Tornillo. Contrasting the two
makes the distinction clear-one is private enterprise protected by the
full strength of the first amendment, the other would almost undoubt-
edly have no existence were it not supported by the student fees of a
state school.
In discussing the question of the right of the student editor, Bill
Goudelock, to exercise his discretion, Judge Goldberg distinguishes be-
tween two segments of the newspaper's content. "[Ulnfettered discre-
tion" should be given to the content of the "editorial product," which
he describes as "the news and editorial columns of the paper, and other
sections that by tradition and popular perception would be subject to
editorial input from the operators of a newspaper."
204
In contrast to this editorial product are the announcements sec-
199. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
200. 536 F.2d at 1075-76 & n.4.
201. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
202. 536 F.2d at 1085 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
203. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
204. 536 F.2d at 1087.
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tions and the advertisements, both of which regularly included
"messages of social, political and informative natures." 20 5 No other ad-
vertisements or announcements were shown to have been excluded, nor
were any established standards or rules formulated, delineating the
boundaries of what was acceptable for publication. 20 6 In this portion of
the newspaper, absent clear, constitutional guidelines, the "equality of
access which the first amendment has properly been read to guaran-
tee"'20 7 should apply. Once having provided a forum, in effect open to
all, the state cannot allow its agent unfettered discretion to censor ad-
vertisements or announcements on the basis of content absent a "sub-
stantial state interest which is compelling.
20 8
The dissent mentions that the associational rights of some stu-
dents-those students who would be interested in the Mississippi Gay
Alliance's activities-are at stake here. 20 9 Also at stake are the rights of
students and others who are already members of the Gay Alliance and
who already have the information in the advertisement. As with a stu-
dent bulletin board, denial of access to the advertisement page of a
student newspaper when the denial is based on the content of the
message is an abridgment of the associational rights of members, as it
impedes their ability to communicate with potential members.
The majority opinion in Goudelock is a good example of the con-
fusion which can occur in cases regarding homosexuals. The fact that
sodomy is illegal in Mississippi indicated to the court that homosexual
organizations have less of a right to put an ad in the student newspaper
than do other organizations. Assuming state action, however, the de-
nial of publication could not be justified, since denial of this associa-
tional benefit is based solely on the content of the message and is thus




The results at law brought about by the confusion between homo-
sexual acts and homosexuality in the abstract are apparent in the judi-
cial treatment of the denial of corporate charters for homosexual
groups by the Secretaries of State of Ohio and Illinois.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1089.
208. Id.
209. 536 F.2d at 1078, 1080 n.15.
210. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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The Greater Cincinnati Gay Society tendered proposed articles of
incorporation to the Secretary of State of Ohio on August 9, 1972.211
The articles of incorporation included the statement that one of the
purposes of the organization was "[t]o promote acceptance of homosex-
uality as a valid life style, whenever, and wherever possible, by legal,
political, or other means. ''2 12 The Secretary refused to accept the pro-
posed articles, stating: "[T]his office finds that acceptance of the pro-
posed articles of incorporation for Greater Cincinnati Gay Society, Inc.
appear to be contrary to public policy since homosexuality as a 'valid
life style' has been, and currently is, defined by statute as a criminal
act."
2 13
The Society filed a complaint in the Ohio Supreme Court on Au-
gust 24, 1972, asking that court for a writ of mandamus to require the
Secretary to accept the articles of incorporation, arguing that no statute
prohibited either the status of homosexuality or the promotion of ho-
mosexuality as a valid life style. Before the court rendered its opinion
the Ohio legislature amended the criminal code so as to decriminalize
consensual acts of sodomy between adults. 214 In State v. Brown, the
Ohio Supreme Court denied the writ in aper curiam opinion, holding:
"Although homosexual acts between consenting adults are no longer
statutory offenses since the new Criminal Code came into effect, there
is still reason for denying the writ. We agree with the Secretary of State
that the promotion of homosexuality as a valid life style is contrary to
the public policy of the State." 215
The opinion pointed out that Ohio's statutes directed its Secretary
of State to grant charters if he finds that they comply with the provi-
sions of a number of sections of the state code, one of which states: "A
corporation may be formed for any purpose or purposes for which nat-
ural persons lawfully may associate themselves. '216 The citation of this
section in the majority opinion denying the charter indicates that the
Secretary of State and the court majority concluded that homosexuality
itself is a crime (despite the repeal of the statute) and that promoting
the acceptance of homosexuality as a valid lifestyle meant only encour-
aging the commission of heretofore illegal sex acts, which they person-
ally found repugnant.
211. State v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 313 N.E.2d 847 (1974).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 112, 313 N.E.2d at 848.
214. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (Page Special Supp. 1973).
215. 39 Ohio St. 2d at 113-14, 313 N.E.2d at 848.
216. Id. at 113, 313 N.E. 2d at 848 (citing OHlo REv. CODE § 1702.03).
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Stern, J., and Brown, J., joined in a dissenting opinion in which
they found this conclusion to have no basis in law. 217 They particularly
objected to the broad discretion conferred on the Secretary of State and
the implication that that office is a vehicle for formulating and imple-
menting public policy, and questioned the source of this "public pol-
icy" found by the Secretary and the majority.218 They could find no
statutes or judicial opinions which would point to such a pol-
icy-indeed, the recent change in the Criminal Code implied the oppo-
site-and pointed out that the Ohio Constitution contained no
preference for sexual life style but that it, and the United States Consti-
tution "do contain, however, a bias in favor of permitting people to
speak their minds and promote their causes in a peaceful manner."'2 19
This decision has been the subject of two critical student notes, 220
both of which focus on the first amendment issue mentioned, but not
developed, by the dissent, and attack the result as a blatant attempt by
the state to deny freedom of speech and association to a group which
advocated the unpopular minority view on a controversial subject. The
two student notes also argue that the decision in State v. Brown
amounts to a violation of equal protection on a "forum" theory and
permits a prior restraint of first amendment rights of expression. The
status of nonprofit incorporation undeniably facilitates the associa-
tional activities of a group,221 and denial of that status will have the
effect of limiting an exchange of ideas on the subject of homosexuality,
thus keeping the advocates of the minority viewpoint "invisible."
The Secretary of State's comments seem to stem from a belief that
homosexuality itself is a status crime, a conclusion directly rejected by
the Eighth Circuit in Gay Lib v. University of Missouri.222 Such a con-
clusion ignores the parallel but distinct definitions of homosexuality
and simply assumes that everyone seeking repeal of laws regulating pri-
vate, consensual sexual activity has committed criminal acts. There re-
ally is no difference between the act of the State of Ohio in denying a
corporate charter to homosexuals seeking to repeal laws they feel op-
pressive and the attempts of the State of Alabama to revoke the right of
the NAACP, an organization composed of individuals who felt the seg-
217. Id. at 114, 313 N.E.2d at 849.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 117, 313 N.E.2d at 851.
220. Note, Corporations: First Amendment Rights, 8 AKRON L. REV. 375 (1975); Note,
Discretionary Granting of Nonprofit Charters, 6 U. TOL. L. REV. 237 (1974).
221. See Note, Discretionary Granting of Nonprofit Charters, 6 U. TOL. L. REV. 237, 248-
49 (1974).
222. 558 F.2d 848, 856 (8th Cir. 1977).
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regation laws of Alabama were oppressive, to operate in Alabama.223
That the white elected officials in Alabama believed a racially inte-
grated society to be not only illegal but contrary to public policy as they
saw it cannot be gainsaid. The effect of the opinion of the Ohio
Supreme Court is to say, "Your sexual orientation makes you criminal
and you may not have the benefit of the state's grant of a corporate
charter to assist you in altering your legal status." Such a result is con-
trary to the United States Supreme Court's statement in Street v. New
York: "It is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States
from imposing criminal punishment for public advocacy of peaceful
change in our institutions.
'224
The constitutional issues surrounding the granting of a corporate
charter are not unlike those surrounding the recognition of campus or-
ganizations. The granting or withholding of corporate status has a sub-
stantial effect upon the functioning of an organization in that it affects
the liability of its officers and members, its ability to contract for goods
and services, and is a prerequisite for obtaining tax-exemption and
tax-deduction privileges. These factors all affect the ability of an asso-
ciation to achieve its purposes, and denial of the corporate charter is
clearly damaging to the associational rights of the organization. As-
suming, arguendo, that the Secretary of State could exercise broad dis-
cretion in the granting of the benefit of a corporate charter,225 the
Supreme Court nevertheless has held that the government "may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests---especially, his interest in freedom of speech. '226 If
Heay v. Jame 227 and its progeny say anything it is that, short of
speech which incites or calls for imminent lawless action, the content of
an association's message may not be the basis for denying a benefit
granted by the state. No showing is made here that the state has any
interest to protect other than the unconstitutional interest in preventing
the dissemination of the idea that homosexuality is a normal, healthy
expression of sexual affection. "The mere disagreement. . . with the
223. The efforts of the Alabama authorities to destroy the NAACP are the subject of
three Supreme Court opinions, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288
(1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 360 U.S. 240 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); and one interim order, see NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S.
16 (1961).
224. 394 U.S. 576, 591 (1969).
225. In fact, historically, states have used corporate charters as a way of approving or
disapproving of the aims of groups. Note, Corporations: First Amendment Rights, 8 AKRON
L. REv. 375, 378-79 n.34 (1975).
226. Perry v. Sindermarm, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
227. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it recognition," 228 or in
this instance a corporate charter. There is no indication that the court
had any basis to believe that granting the charter would lead to in-
creased violations of a now-repealed sodomy statute.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York and
the Court of Appeals of New York, when similarly confronted with a
homophile organization seeking nonprofit incorporation, 229 reached a
conclusion opposite to that in State v. Brown.
In October of 1970 the Gay Activists Alliance submitted a certifi-
cate of incorporation pursuant to the New York Not-for-Profit Corpo-
ration Law, stating these purposes:
1. (a) To safeguard the rights guaranteed homosexual individuals
by the constitutions and civil rights laws of the United States and
the several States, through peaceful petition and assembly and
nonviolent protest when necessary.
(b) To speak out on public issues as a homosexual civil rights
organization, working within the framework of the laws of the
United States, but vigilant and vigorous in fighting any discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation of the individual.
(c) To work for the repeal of all laws regulating sexual conduct
and practices between consenting adults.
(d) To work for the passage of laws insuring equal treatment
under the law of all persons regardless of sexual orientation.
(e) To instill in homosexuals a sense of pride and self-worth.
(f) To promote a better understanding of homosexuality among
homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, in order to achieve mutual
respect, understanding and friendship.
(g) To hold meetings and social events for the better realization
of the aforesaid purposes enunciated in (a) through (f) inclusive
above, and to achieve, ultimately, the complete liberation of
homosexuals from all injustice, visited upon them as such, that
they may receive ultimate recognition as free and equal members
of the human community.
230
The Secretary rejected the certificate, citing the connotation of the
words in the proposed name and stating that its purposes were to pro-
mote activities contrary to both "public policy" and specific provisions
of the State Penal Code. A petition to the Supreme Court of New York
to overturn this decision was denied in Gay Activists Alliance v.
Lomenzo. 23' The court relied on the respondent's argument that the
228. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972).
229. Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d
108 (1973).
230. Owles v. Lomenzo, 38 App. Div. 2d 981, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1972), affidsub non.
Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d 108
(1973).
231. 66 Misc. 2d 456, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Owles v.
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public policy of the State of New York had been established by the
legislature when it enacted the sections of the Penal Law that prohibit
consensual sodomy. The Secretary's act, then, was not an abuse of dis-
cretion. The court found that, although working for the repeal of legis-
lation is a proper and lawful purpose for a group, in this case "the
petitioners. . . by identifying themselves as a 'homosexual civil rights
organization'. . . are professing a present or future intent to disobey a
penal statute of the State of New York .... *232 The court went on to
explain the basis of this assumption: "it would seem that in order to
be a homosexual, the prohibited act must have at some time been com-
mitted or at least presently contemplated. ' 233 The distinction between
functional and passive homosexuals234 aside, the statement seems to
equate the contemplation of an act with the commission of it. To once
again draw the analogy to the black civil rights movement, it is difficult
to believe that any New York court would deny the right of blacks to
incorporate for the purpose of repealing laws discriminating against
blacks. One need not have ridden on an integrated bus (once against
the law in many southern states) to desire the repeal of such laws, nor
would the right of association doctrine permit the denial of a state ben-
efit on the basis that the purpose of the corporation is to change an
existing law. So too in Lomenzo, the court showed an inability to sepa-
rate the illegality of homosexual acts from the legality of peaceful polit-
ical activity aimed at repealing legislation.
On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed. 235
This court found that, the Penal Law notwithstanding, the public pol-
icy of the State is not violated unless the expressed purposes in a pro-
posed certificate of incorporation are unlawful, and that in this case
those purposes were perfectly lawful. The opinion points out that an
opposite holding would permit the Secretary of State to impose his per-
sonal opinion as to what constitutes improper conduct on the granting
of nonprofit incorporation.236 Here, since the formal filing require-
ments were met, the refusal to accept the certificate was an abuse of
Lomenzo, 38 App. Div. 2d 981, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1972), affd sub nom. Gay Activists Alli-
ance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973).
232. Id. at 459, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 996-97. The court refers to § 130.38 which regulates
sexual conduct between members of the same sex.
233. Id. at 459, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
234. See text accompanying notes 7 & 12 supra.
235. Owles v. Lomenzo, 38 App. Div. 2d 981, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1972), aff'dsub nora.
Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d 108
(1973).
236. Id. at 982, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
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discretion.
2 3 7
This decision was upheld in the Court of Appeals of New York on
the basis of the Secretary of State's lack of authority to label lawful
corporate purposes as violative of public policy.238 According to the
Supreme Court's decisions on the extent of protection afforded rights of
association, no one in the state could exercise such authority unless im-
plementing clearly delineated standards not impinging upon first
amendment rights. As the purposes of the organization reveal no pres-
ent intent to violate any state statute, and the Secretary of State demon-
strated no substantial interest in preventing the promotion of "the
acceptance of homosexuality as a valid life style" the articles could not
be constitutionally rejected. Although discussion of homosexuality has,
in the past, been caught up in some courts' definitions of obscenity, 239 it
could not now be considered beyond the pale of the first amendment's
protection of speech. Thus no constitutionally acceptable basis exists
for denying benefits to this group because of its purposes.
Clearly, that of which the Appellate Division disapproved in
Lomenzo was what in fact occurred in Brown: the Secretary imposed
his personal opinion about improper conduct.
It is worthy of notice that the absence or presence of state statutes
criminalizing consensual sodomy between adults was not determinative
in these cases. The Brown decision shows that the homophobic atti-
tudes of administrators and courts can overcome what would otherwise
appear to be a legislative statement that homosexual acts are no longer
to be considered as being "against public policy." The Lomenzo deci-
sion shows that, even where statutes prohibiting consensual sodomy are
in effect, a court need not see their existence as an impediment to the
efforts of homosexuals to organize to change those laws.
Tax Exemption
Although recent experiences of homosexual rights organizations
may indicate a change in Internal Revenue Service policies,2 40 the IRS
has placed considerable barriers in the path of groups seeking tax-ex-
237. Id.
238. Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d
108 (1973). As was pointed out in the decision of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, "[T]he public policy of the State is not violated unless the expressed purposes
contained in the proposed certificate are unlawful." Owles v. Lomenzo, 38 App. Div. 2d
981, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183, affd sub nom. Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d
965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1973).
239. E.g., Rhinehart v. Rhay, 314 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
240. See, e.g., The Advocate, Aug. 9, 1978, at 10, col. 5.
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empt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The
manner in which the Exempt Organization Branch of the IRS has han-
dled applications for tax-exempt status raises questions, in light of the
first amendment, concerning the right of a governmental agency to
place restraints upon the content of the message of organizations that
are organized for charitable or educational purposes.
A case in point is that of the Gay Community Services Center of
Los Angeles which was incorporated in California as a nonprofit cor-
poration organized exclusively for charitable purposes on January 4,
1972,24! and subsequently filed an application with the IRS for tax-
exempt status under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3). An ex-
change of letters with the IRS Exempt Organizations Branch clarified
the nature of the Gay Community Services Center's organizational
aims and activites: the Center was formed for the purposes of serving
the individuals of the homosexual community on a nonprofit basis and
developing an educational program directed toward increasing public
awareness of the problems of homosexuality by providing such services
as medical and psychological treatment, adjustment services to parolees
and probationers, employment training and placement, housing devel-
opment and referral, legal assistance, financial assistance, and counsel-
ing.242 The Center planned to put these purposes into effect by holding
workshops, providing consultation services to public and private agen-
cies, producing educational publications, setting up residential housing
programs for alcoholics and ex-offenders, and directly providing legal
and medical services.
243
These programs were intended to fall within the requirements of
section 501(c)(3) and relevant regulations regarding educational and
charitable organizations.244 The IRS did not question the Gay Com-
munity Services Center's compliance with the financial organization re-
quirements of the statute.2 45 The IRS did, however, deny the
application of the Gay Community Services Center in a letter which
stated only that the organization was not organized and operated exclu-
sively for charitable and educational purposes, and gave no further
explanation. 246
241. Gay Community Services Center Articles of Incorporation.
242. Letter from M. Cerny, Chief, Rulings Section, Exempt Organizations Branch, to
Gay Community Services Center (Jan. 10, 1973).
243. Id.
244. See notes 250-64 and accompanying text infra.
245. Letter from M. Cerny to Gay Community Services Center (Aug. 2, 1974).
246. Letter from M. Cerny to Gay Community Services Center (Jan. 10, 1973).
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The concern of the IRS over the validity of the application appar-
ently centered on the organization's attitude toward homosexuality it-
self.247 Tax-exempt status was finally granted after two conferences
between the IRS and representatives of the Center. In the letter grant-
ing this status, the same organizational purposes and programs were
cited, but with additional reference to information submitted to clarify
"some of the problem areas that had been the basis for our original
denial of your application for recognition of exemption ....
Among the matters clarified were: that one could be "Gay" without
being characterized as "homosexual," that Gay Community Services
Center does not contend that homosexuality is normal, and that none
of Gay Community Services Center's officers or Directors are avowed
homosexuals.
249
This restricted grant of tax-exempt status deserves some examina-
tion in the light of the established law on section 501(c)(3). The Inter-
nal Revenue Code section requires that in order for an organization to
be exempt it must be organized and operated exclusively for one or
more enumerated purposes, including "charitable" and "educational."
The organization must meet both an organizational test and an opera-
tional test to qualify.250 Charitable organizations include those
designed for relief of the poor, distressed and underprivileged, lessen-
ing the burdens of government, promotion of social welfare, elimina-
tion of prejudice and discrimination, and the defense of human and
civil rights secured by law.2 5 ' An organization is not precluded from
qualifying under Treasury Regulations section 1.501(c)(3) by the fact
that, in carrying out its primary charitable purpose, it also advocates
social changes or presents an opinion on controversial issues with the
intention of molding public opinion or creating public sentiment to an
acceptance of its views, as long as it is not an "action" organization.
2 52
An organization is "action" only if a substantial part of its activity is
directed at influencing legislation by any means, or if its main or pri-
mary objectives can be attained only by the adoption or rejection of
legislation, or if it participates in an elective campaign. An organiza-
tion is not an "action" organization if it advocates, as an insubstantial
247. See letter, M. Cerny to Gay Community Services Center (Nov. 10, 1972), request-
ing "a description of the steps you will take to encourage or prevent social or other activities
that may be considered to facilitate homosexual practices."
248. Letter from M. Cerny to Gay Community Services Center (Aug. 2, 1974).
249. Id.
250. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(a)(I), T.D. 7428, 41 F.R. 34620.
251. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2), T.D. 7428, 41 F.R. 34620.
252. Id.
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part of its activities, the adoption or rejection of legislation.253
"Educational" purposes include the instruction or training of indi-
viduals and the instruction of the public on subjects useful to the indi-
vidual and beneficial to the community. 254 The term "educational
purposes" has been interpreted broadly. 255 The limits of what sort of
information is "educational" are outlined in the statement that
[a]n organization may be educational even though it advocates a par-
ticular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a sufficiently full
and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or
the public to form an independent opinion or conclusion. On the
other hand, an organization is not educational if its principal func-
tion is the mere presentation of unsupported opinion.
256
This statement has been clarified by revenue ruling: "An organization
is not denied exemption as an educational organization if it seeks to
inform the public on a controversial issue, or takes a position which is
not widely accepted.
'257
Many section 501(c)(3) organizations offer charitable or educa-
tional services to specialized groups (minority groups, 258 senior citi-
zens,259 poor people,260 women 261) and often concern themselves with
controversial matters (abortion,262 equal rights for women, 263 racial
integration 264).
To seek to inform the public about a controversial subject qualifies
as an educational function within the meaning of section 501(c)(3), but
an organization must stop short of furnishing only "unsupported opin-
ion" to bolster its point of view. A group that provides charitable serv-
ices may also advocate social change, such as the adoption or rejection
of legislation, but it must not actually lobby for legislative change to a
substantial degree or campaign for any candidate. These restrictions
on an organization's speech and activities mark the line between orga-
nizations that provide services beneficial to the public, which deserve
253. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3), T.D. 7428, 41 F.R. 34620.
254. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3), T.D. 7428, 41 F.R. 34620.
255. Personal counseling, for instance, qualifies as an educational function. See Rev.
Rul. 68-656, 1968-2 C.B. 216.
256. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i), T.D. 7428, 41 F.R. 34620.
257. Rev. Rul. 68-656, 1968-2 C.B. 216.
258. Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115 (housing).
259. Rev. Rul. 75-198, 1975-1 C.B. 157 (multi-services).
260. Rev. Rul. 69-441, 1969-2 C.B. 115 (help with financial problems).
261. Rev. Rul. 72-228, 1972-1 C.B. 148 (equal rights).
262. Rev. Rul. 73-569, 1973-2 C.B. 178.
263. Rev. Rul. 72-228, 1972-1 C.B. 148.
264. Rev. Rul. 68-655, 1968-2 C.B. 213.
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the incentive of a tax exemption, and organizations that exist to pro-
mote particular activities, which do not.
When the IRS extends its administrative judgment beyond this pe-
rimeter to demand that an organization profess adherence to the major-
ity view of a controversial issue, which it has done with the Gay
Community Services Center, it requires the relinquishment of rights
protected by the first amendment as a condition to the grant of a benefit
created by legislation to favor just such groups as the Center.
The record of the Center's application for tax-exempt status shows
that it is a bona fide charitable and educational organization. It pro-
vides a variety of services which have been recognized as charitable
and educational; as is typical of organizations which are commonly
granted tax-exempt status, its services are mainly of benefit to a certain
segment of the population, homosexuals. However, it also seeks to in-
form the public at large about issues concerning homosexuality and
takes a position on these issues. The issues are controversial and the
position taken is not widely accepted, but this does not preclude tax
exemption. What then would be the basis for a denial of tax-exempt
status if the group did contend that homosexuality is "normal?"
In 1958 the Supreme Court, in Speiser v. Randall,265 found that a
discriminatory denial of tax exemption due to engaging in speech was
an unconstitutional limitation on free speech. The State of California
had provided a property-tax exemption for all veterans, but circum-
scribed this grant by a statutory denial of the tax exemption to any
veteran who advocated the violent overthrow of the government. Vet-
erans who wished to receive the exemption were required to file a loy-
alty oath. The court held:
It cannot be gainsaid that a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption
for engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech. . . . To deny
an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is
in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the
same as if the state were to fine them for this speech. The appellees
are plainly mistaken in their argument that, because a tax exemption
is a "privilege" or "bounty," its denial may not infringe speech.2 66
If advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government is not a good
enough reason for the discriminatory withholding of a tax exemption,
surely the assertion of the belief that homosexuality is normal cannot
be a good enough reason.
In Speiser v. RandaiPl67 the California Supreme Court had con-
265. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
266. Id. at 518.
267. 48 Cal. 2d. 903, 311 P.2d 546 (1957).
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strued the limitation on the property tax exemption so that it applied
only to claimants who engaged in speech for which they could be crimi-
nally punished consistent with the free speech guarantees of the United
States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court held that, al-
though a denial of the exemption to persons who engaged in speech for
which they could be fined or imprisoned was valid, the loyalty oath
requirement in this case was not valid because it put the burden on the
taxpayer to persuade the assessor that he fell outside the class denied
the exemption; this shortcut to a determination of tax liability was un-
justified in this situation because important first amendment free
speech rights were at stake.
268
Similarly, the IRS has extracted an assurance from the Gay Com-
munity Services Center that it will not engage in constitutionally pro-
tected speech, but has not come forward with a valid justification for its
demand. It sees a "serious risk of encouraging or fostering homosexual
attitudes among minors and other impressionable members of soci-
ety"269-but is this an appropriate concern for the IRS?
The question thus raised here is whether the "risk of encouraging
or fostering homosexual attitudes" is the sort of consideration which
should determine a grant of tax-exemptibility. Does the IRS have un-
fettered discretion over whether to grant a tax exemption, or is it sub-
ject to some constitutional restraints? The issue can be analyzed from
the standpoint of the law on "unconstitutional conditions. '270 Tax ex-
emption is a valuable government benefit that nonprofit social services
organizations need to survive. Although nobody has a "right" to a tax
exemption, to condition the grant of an exemption on the requirement
that the applicant give up free speech rights would be violative of con-
stitutional principles. 27'
An alternative analysis is from the standpoint of the group's right
of association. The group's ability to carry out its organizational pur-
poses-providing social services-would be severely prejudiced by a
denial of tax-exempt status. Therefore, in the absence of an overriding
state interest, to deny tax-exempt status based on the content of the
268. 357 U.S. at 519-29.
269. Letter from M. Cerny to Gay Community Services Center (Nov. 10, 1972).
270. See generally O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Wefare Benefts With Strings
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443, 463-66 (1966); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions And Con-
stitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
271. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972).
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"message" of the group would be an infringement of the group's associ-
ational rights.
One commentator has argued that the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions should not be applicable to the Internal Revenue Code at
all, since a determination of what constitutes a "tax benefit" is impossi-
ble in the absence of a model income tax structure. 272 This argument,
however, while applicable to the issue of the constitutionality of the
statutory requirement that tax-exempt groups not attempt to influence
legislation, is not applicable to administrative decisions made under the
statute. In this case, the statute and applicable regulations provide the
model.
If it is accepted that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
should apply to limit the discretion of IRS officials, then a decision to
condition tax exemption on adherence to a majority point of view on a
controversial issue should be invalid as a violation of constitutional
rights.
Conclusion
This Article indicates that progress in the advancement of gay
rights through the litigation process will best be achieved when the
well-established right of association is used as the rationale for chal-
lenging state actions which seek to restrict organized attempts to chal-
lenge oppressive laws. Central to this rationale is the distinction
between homosexual acts and the status of homosexuality, the func-
tional and passive definitions, so that jurists do not confuse organizing
to aid homosexuals and the gay rights cause with organizing to break
state laws where they still exist.
272. Note, Constitutional Law - Inapplicability of The Unconstitutional Conditions Doc-
trine To The InternalRevenue Code, 35 OHIO ST. L. J. 238, 245-50 (1974).
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